Published: May 2026 Sector: Automotive Retail Technology / Digital Marketplaces Website: https://www.truecar.com Stock (prior to take-private): NASDAQ: TRUE Status: Taken private January 2026 (Fair Holdings, Inc.)
TrueCar, Inc. is one of the most recognizable names in digital automotive retail — a platform that fundamentally reshaped how consumers shop for new and used cars by introducing transparent pricing and dealer price competition to an industry historically opaque about what buyers actually pay. Founded in 2005 by serial automotive entrepreneur Scott Painter, TrueCar pioneered the "see what others paid" concept that gave car buyers leverage they had never had before. The company went public in 2014 at a valuation that made it one of the marquee names in automotive technology, but a combination of regulatory pushback, dealer friction, leadership turmoil, and sustained financial decline led to a long erosion of its market position. In January 2026, after 12 years as a public company, TrueCar was taken private by Fair Holdings — a consortium led by founder Scott Painter with backing from Zurich North America and AutoNation — in a $227 million all-cash transaction that returned the company to its roots and set the stage for a new chapter.
For dealership decision-makers, TrueCar's story is particularly instructive. It illustrates both the enormous opportunity and the existential risk of the third-party lead generation model, the power dynamics between dealers and digital platforms, and what happens when a company that was built to disrupt the industry has to learn to partner with it instead.
TrueCar was originally incorporated under the name Zag.com Inc. in Delaware in February 2005 by Scott Painter and Tom Taira. Painter was already a veteran of the automotive technology space — he had previously founded Zag, a white-label auto-buying platform that provided pricing and inventory tools to affinity groups like credit unions and membership organizations. The initial concept was B2B: Zag would power car-buying programs for partners such as Capital One, letting their customers arrange financing, access upfront pricing, and locate inventory through a branded experience.
The true consumer-facing product emerged three years later. After a year of development, Painter and Taira introduced TrueCar during TechCrunch's Startup Battlefield in 2008 — launching it as a separate brand from Zag. The core innovation was deceptively simple: TrueCar gathered automotive retail transaction data from thousands of sources to show consumers what other people had actually paid for any given vehicle in their area. Rather than relying on MSRP or dealer-claimed discounts, buyers could see real market prices — the "TrueCar" price. For the first time, the information asymmetry that had long favored dealerships began to tilt toward consumers.
Zag and TrueCar merged in 2010, consolidating the B2B and B2C operations under a single entity.
The period from 2011 to 2014 was one of aggressive expansion and landmark deals. In January 2011, TrueCar released ClearBook, a used-vehicle index that applied the same data-driven pricing methodology to the used car market. That May, the company acquired Honk.com, a social car-shopping platform backed by News Corp, signaling its ambition to build a comprehensive digital car-buying ecosystem.
The most significant acquisition of this era came in August 2011 when TrueCar bought ALG (Automotive Lease Guide), a company that provided industry-standard residual value forecasts. ALG had been the authoritative source for projected vehicle resale values for decades — its data was used by manufacturers, lenders, and dealers alike. The acquisition gave TrueCar institutional credibility and a revenue stream independent of its consumer marketplace.
In January 2012, TrueCar announced a blockbuster $150 million, three-year exclusive partnership with Yahoo!, replacing Yahoo's existing automotive content with TrueCar's shopping tools. It was one of the largest deals in digital automotive at the time and put TrueCar in front of Yahoo's massive audience.
The company also invested heavily in brand awareness. In 2011, it launched its first television advertising campaign. In 2012, it sponsored the first all-female racing team in partnership with Penske Media Corporation and Dragon Racing, and launched a "Women Empowered" initiative with support from the Virgin Group — moves designed to broaden car buying's appeal to demographics that traditional dealership marketing often neglected.
On May 16, 2014, TrueCar went public on NASDAQ under the ticker symbol TRUE. The IPO was a milestone — validation of the transparent pricing model and proof that digital automotive marketplaces could achieve public market scale.
In 2015, TrueCar made a pivotal leadership change. Scott Painter stepped down as CEO and was replaced by Chip Perry, the former CEO of AutoTrader.com — a choice that signaled TrueCar's desire to professionalize its operations and build stronger relationships with the dealer community Painter's disruptive style had sometimes alienated.
The Perry era was defined by a tension between growth and dealer satisfaction. On one hand, TrueCar's dealer network grew by more than 24% year-over-year in mid-2017. On the other hand, the company faced escalating legal and regulatory challenges.
In 2015, 108 car dealerships filed a class-action lawsuit against TrueCar, alleging false advertising of its "non-negotiation" pricing policy and violations of the Lanham Act. Dealers argued that TrueCar's marketing led consumers to believe they were getting the absolute lowest price when in practice the system was more nuanced. The lawsuit dragged on for four years before a federal judge dismissed it in 2019.
Meanwhile, the California New Car Dealers Association (CNCDA) brought its own lawsuit against TrueCar in 2015, alleging that the company's billing model violated California law. The case was settled in December 2017, with TrueCar agreeing to modify its billing model in the state — a significant concession that had implications for how the company could monetize its dealer relationships.
The Perry era came to an abrupt end in 2019. After disappointing first-quarter results, TrueCar announced the immediate resignations of CEO Chip Perry, CTO/CPO Tommy McClung, CMO Neeraj Gunsager, and EVP Brian Skutta. The sweeping executive purge was extraordinary and signaled deep problems. Shareholders also filed a lawsuit against the company for allegedly misleading them about its financial health.
The post-Perry era coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic, which created a uniquely difficult environment for auto retail. TrueCar launched a new brand identity and website redesign in early 2020, but the pandemic-driven shutdowns and supply chain disruptions upended car buying patterns.
In May 2020, TrueCar announced a restructuring that included laying off 30% of its workforce. The company also lost one of its most important affinity partners: USAA, the military banking and insurance giant, ended its long-standing Car Buying Service partnership with TrueCar. To partially offset the loss, TrueCar launched a program focused on active military members.
CEO Michael Darrow took the helm during this period and led the company through the pandemic recovery. Under Darrow, TrueCar narrowed its focus, invested in its digital retailing tools, and worked to stabilize the dealer network. But the financial trajectory remained negative for four straight years.
On June 14, 2023, Darrow resigned. CFO Jantoon Reigersman took over as CEO and immediately announced another round of layoffs — this time cutting 24% of the company's employees. By this point, TrueCar had shed more than half of its peak workforce in just three years.
Under Reigersman, TrueCar stabilized somewhat but never returned to growth. By late 2024, the company's stock was trading at a fraction of its IPO price, and the strategic options were narrowing. In October 2025, TrueCar announced that it had agreed to be acquired by Fair Holdings, Inc. — a company formed by a group of investors led by none other than founder Scott Painter, with Zurich North America and AutoNation as key partners.
The deal was an all-cash transaction valued at approximately $227 million, representing a premium over the prevailing stock price but a far cry from the company's peak market capitalization of over $2 billion. Both ISS and Glass Lewis, the leading independent proxy advisory firms, recommended that stockholders vote in favor of the transaction.
TrueCar stockholders approved the deal on December 23, 2025, and the transaction closed on January 21, 2026. TrueCar was once again a private company, back in the hands of its founder with the backing of one of the largest auto retailers in the world (AutoNation) and a major insurance carrier (Zurich North America).
TrueCar's business model is built on a three-sided marketplace connecting consumers, dealers, and affinity partners. Each side creates value for the others, and TrueCar monetizes primarily through dealer subscriptions and per-sale fees.
For consumers, TrueCar provides a free search and shopping platform. The value proposition is straightforward: enter the make, model, trim, and options you want, and TrueCar shows you what other people in your area have actually paid for the same vehicle, along with "guaranteed" pricing offers from local dealers. The key features include:
TrueCar Price: A market-based price estimate calculated from recent transaction data in the local market. This is the company's signature product — it tells buyers what a fair price is before they ever set foot in a dealership.
TrueCar+ (Digital Retailing): An optional end-to-end online purchasing capability that lets consumers complete the entire transaction digitally, including financing, trade-in valuation, and contract signing.
Trade-In Valuation: Powered by ALG data, providing estimated trade-in values based on market conditions and projected residual values.
Dealer Reviews and Ratings: Consumer feedback on dealerships, integrated into the shopping experience.
Vehicle Research: Specifications, comparisons, safety ratings, and expert and consumer reviews.
For dealers, TrueCar functions as a customer acquisition platform — effectively a pay-for-performance lead generation service. The core offering is access to in-market car buyers who have already expressed intent to purchase a specific vehicle. Key elements include:
TrueCar Certified Dealers: Dealers pay a subscription fee and/or per-sale fee to participate in the network. In exchange, they receive qualified leads — consumers who have already identified the exact vehicle they want and received a "TrueCar Price" estimate.
Performance-Based Pricing: TrueCar moved away from its original pay-per-sale model to a performance-adjusted subscription model after regulatory pushback in 2011-2012. Dealers pay a recurring fee that is adjusted based on the volume and quality of leads they receive and convert.
Dealer Digital Storefront: Dealers can manage their inventory, pricing, and offers through TrueCar's dealer portal, including integration with their existing DMS and inventory management systems.
TrueCar ActiveListings: A real-time inventory feed that shows consumers exactly which vehicles are available at which dealers, along with pricing.
A critical — and often overlooked — part of TrueCar's business model is its network of affinity partners. These are organizations (credit unions, membership associations, employers, insurance companies) that offer TrueCar's car-buying service as a member benefit. Partners include Capital One, USAA (historically), AARP, and over 250 other organizations.
The affinity channel is powerful because it delivers a pre-qualified, high-intent audience. Members trust their organization's endorsement, arrive more informed, and convert at higher rates than generic web traffic. TrueCar shares revenue with affinity partners and uses the channel to differentiate itself from competitors who lack similar distribution.
TrueCar generates revenue through three primary channels:
Dealer Subscriptions and Fees: The largest revenue source. Dealers pay monthly subscription fees (adjusted for performance) plus per-vehicle fees when a sale is completed through the platform.
Affinity Partner Revenue Sharing: A portion of dealer fees is shared with affinity partners; the remainder is TrueCar's revenue from this channel.
ALG Residual Value Data: A B2B data licensing business that provides residual value forecasts to automakers, lenders, fleet managers, and leasing companies. This is a high-margin, subscription-based revenue stream with deep institutional relationships.
TrueCar operates in a crowded and evolving digital automotive marketplace. The competitive set includes both direct competitors (other third-party lead generation and pricing platforms) and indirect competitors (classifieds, peer-to-peer marketplaces, and OEM direct sales channels).
CarGurus is TrueCar's closest publicly traded competitor and arguably its most formidable rival. Founded in 2006 and based in Cambridge, MA, CarGurus uses a data-driven algorithm to rank dealer inventory by "Great Deal," "Good Deal," or "Overpriced" — a consumer-friendly approach similar to TrueCar's transparency ethos. CarGurus went public in 2017 and has generally performed better than TrueCar as a public company.
Key differences: CarGurus started as a classifieds and research platform and added lead generation later; TrueCar started as a lead generation and pricing platform. CarGurus has a much larger audience (higher monthly unique visitors) and a stronger organic SEO presence. CarGurus also owns Autolist (a used car marketplace) and has a growing digital retailing capability.
Carvana represents a fundamentally different business model — it is an e-commerce retailer that buys, reconditions, and sells used cars directly to consumers, bypassing franchised dealers entirely. Founded in 2012 and headquartered in Tempe, AZ, Carvana built a vertically integrated operation centered on its iconic car vending machines and home delivery.
Key differences: Carvana is a principal (buys and sells inventory), while TrueCar is an agent (connects buyers with dealers). Carvana's model requires massive capital for inventory and physical infrastructure; TrueCar is asset-light. Carvana's financial challenges (near-bankruptcy in 2023, subsequent recovery) highlight the risks of the principal model, while TrueCar's struggles illustrate the challenges of the agent model.
Cox Automotive, a subsidiary of privately held Cox Enterprises, is the 800-pound gorilla of automotive digital services. Its portfolio includes Kelley Blue Book (KBB), Autotrader, Manheim (the largest wholesale auto auction), Dealer.com (digital marketing), and vAuto (inventory management), among dozens of other brands.
Key differences: Cox's scale is unmatched — KBB is the most trusted pricing brand in automotive, and Autotrader is one of the largest car listing sites. TrueCar cannot compete with Cox's resources, breadth of offerings, or dealer relationships. However, Cox's portfolio consists of separate brands that don't always integrate seamlessly, creating an opening for more focused competitors like TrueCar.
Edmunds, owned by CDK Global (which is itself owned by Brookfield Business Partners), is another established automotive research and shopping platform. Like TrueCar, it offers pricing information, dealer reviews, and a marketplace connecting consumers with dealers.
Key differences: Edmunds has a stronger editorial and content operation (reviews, comparisons, buying guides) and is more deeply integrated into CDK's dealer management system ecosystem. TrueCar's pricing data and transparency focus are more differentiated.
TrueCar's product suite has evolved significantly over its 20-year history, shifting from a pure pricing and lead generation platform to a more comprehensive digital retailing solution.
The TrueCar marketplace remains the company's flagship product. Consumers visit the website or mobile app, search for a vehicle, and receive upfront pricing from TrueCar Certified Dealers. The key differentiator is the transaction data — TrueCar claims to analyze over 12 million new and used vehicle transactions annually, providing the most accurate picture of what cars actually sell for in local markets.
Launched in the 2020-2021 timeframe, TrueCar+ is the company's digital retailing platform that allows consumers to complete the entire car purchase online — from price negotiation (or acceptance) through financing, trade-in, and delivery logistics. TrueCar+ positions the company as more than a lead generator; it's a full transaction platform. However, adoption has been uneven, and most consumers still complete their purchases at the dealership.
The ALG acquisition in 2011 continues to pay dividends. ALG provides residual value forecasts that are used by automakers for lease program design, by lenders for lease and loan underwriting, and by fleet managers for vehicle lifecycle planning. This is a high-margin, subscription-based business that operates independently of the consumer marketplace and provides a stable revenue base.
TrueCar provides dealers with a suite of software tools including:
For larger dealership groups and enterprise partners, TrueCar offers API access to its pricing data, inventory feeds, and lead management capabilities — enabling custom integrations with existing DMS and CRM systems.
TrueCar's financial history tells the story of a company that achieved impressive scale but never sustained profitability.
TrueCar's revenue grew rapidly through its first decade, peaking in the mid-2010s. However, by the late 2010s, revenue began to plateau and then decline as competitive pressure intensified, dealer relationships frayed, and consumer acquisition costs rose.
At its peak, TrueCar generated over $370 million in annual revenue. By the time of the Fair Holdings acquisition in late 2025, annual revenue had declined significantly, with the company reporting ongoing operating losses. The Q3 2025 financial results, released in November 2025, showed continued challenges in both top-line revenue and profitability.
TrueCar has been profitable on a GAAP basis only in isolated quarters, primarily driven by one-time gains rather than operational efficiency. The company has consistently reported net losses, driven by high sales and marketing costs (necessary to maintain brand awareness and consumer traffic), technology investments, and the overhead of a public company.
TrueCar's IPO price was set at $9 per share in May 2014. The stock initially traded well, peaking above $30 per share in 2014-2015 as investors bought into the transparent pricing narrative. However, the stock declined steadily through the late 2010s as financial results disappointed.
The pandemic-era supply chain disruptions of 2020-2022 created a paradox for TrueCar: inventory shortages meant fewer cars to shop for, reducing lead volume, while simultaneously driving up prices (and TrueCar's per-transaction fees). The stock hit multi-year lows in 2023 following the Darrow resignation and second large layoff.
The acquisition by Fair Holdings in 2025 was priced at a premium to the prevailing market price but well below the company's historical highs. At the time of the deal's announcement, TrueCar's market capitalization was approximately $227 million — a far cry from the over $2 billion peak.
| Metric | 2019 | 2021 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | ~$390M | ~$250M | ~$165M | ~$150M |
| Net Income (Loss) | ~($50M) | ~($40M) | ~($55M) | ~($30M) |
| Franchise Dealers | ~14,000 | ~12,000 | ~10,000 | ~9,000 |
| Affinity Partners | 250+ | 250+ | 250+ | 250+ |
(Note: Precise figures for the most recent periods reflect estimates based on public filings; exact figures for the private period are no longer publicly reported.)
TrueCar's transparent pricing model was revolutionary for consumers but threatening to an industry that had spent decades optimizing around information asymmetry. In late 2011, shortly after the company launched its first major television advertising campaign, several state regulatory agencies notified TrueCar that its practices were noncompliant with state laws governing auto brokering and dealer licensing.
The central issue was whether TrueCar was acting as an unlicensed auto broker by setting prices and connecting consumers with dealers for a fee. TrueCar overhauled its pricing structure in response, moving from a pure pay-per-sale model to a performance-adjusted subscription model in many states — a change that preserved the core marketplace while addressing regulatory concerns.
The 2015 class-action lawsuit filed by 108 dealerships was a pivotal moment. The dealers alleged that TrueCar's marketing of a "non-negotiation" price was misleading — that in practice, consumers were still negotiating, and the "TrueCar Price" was not always the lowest available. The suit sought damages under the Lanham Act (false advertising).
The case was dismissed in 2019, but the four-year legal battle consumed management attention, legal costs, and dealer goodwill. Many dealers who had been ambivalent about TrueCar became actively hostile.
The California New Car Dealers Association lawsuit was arguably more consequential. TrueCar settled in 2017 by agreeing to modify its billing model in California — the nation's largest auto market. The settlement didn't specify the exact changes, but it effectively forced TrueCar to restructure how it charges dealers in the state, reducing the per-sale economics.
The loss of USAA as an affinity partner in 2020 was a major blow. USAA had been one of TrueCar's most important distribution channels, providing access to millions of high-credit military members and their families. The loss was cited as a contributing factor to the 30% workforce reduction announced that same month.
TrueCar has had four CEOs in a decade: Scott Painter (2005-2015), Chip Perry (2015-2019), Michael Darrow (2019-2023), and Jantoon Reigersman (2023-2026). The revolving door at the top created strategic whiplash. Each CEO brought a different vision — Painter's disruptive growth, Perry's dealer-reconciliation, Darrow's stabilization, and Reigersman's cost-cutting — and the company struggled to maintain strategic continuity.
TrueCar's fundamental challenge is that its business model creates an inherent tension with the dealers it depends on. Dealers use TrueCar because it delivers qualified leads, but they also resent the fees and the transparency TrueCar forces on their pricing. As dealers have developed their own digital retailing capabilities (often through vendors like CDK, Reynolds and Reynolds, or Cox Automotive), their dependence on TrueCar has decreased.
This dynamic creates a structural headwind: the better TrueCar's technology gets, the more dealers learn from it and build competing capabilities in-house. TrueCar must continuously demonstrate that it delivers incremental value that dealers cannot replicate on their own.
The January 2026 acquisition by Fair Holdings marks the beginning of a new chapter for TrueCar. Several aspects of the deal are noteworthy.
The most dramatic element of the transaction is the return of founder Scott Painter. Painter had been largely absent from TrueCar's operations since stepping down as CEO in 2015, but he assembled the Fair Holdings consortium and will lead the company's strategy going forward. Painter's return signals an intent to go back to the company's disruptive roots — but with the benefit of 20 years of learning about what works and what doesn't in automotive retail.
AutoNation's participation as a strategic partner is particularly significant. AutoNation is the largest franchised auto retailer in the United States, with over 300 dealerships and annual revenue exceeding $25 billion. Its involvement suggests that the largest dealer group in the country sees strategic value in the TrueCar platform — either as a distribution channel, a technology platform, or both.
For TrueCar, having AutoNation as a partner rather than an adversary could reshape the company's relationship with the dealer community. If AutoNation — the 800-pound gorilla of franchised auto retail — endorses TrueCar's approach, it may give other dealer groups the confidence to deepen their TrueCar partnerships.
Zurich North America's involvement brings insurance industry heft. Zurich is one of the largest commercial insurance carriers, with significant exposure to the automotive sector through dealer insurance programs, F&I products, and fleet coverage. Its participation suggests potential for TrueCar to expand into F&I product distribution, warranty offerings, or insurance-adjacent services — areas where the company has historically been limited.
For dealership decision-makers, the take-private has several implications:
A More Stable Platform: As a private company, TrueCar is no longer subject to quarterly earnings pressure from public markets. This may allow management to invest in long-term product improvements rather than short-term revenue optimization.
Potential for Deeper OEM Integration: With AutoNation as a partner, TrueCar may develop closer ties to manufacturers and their incentive programs, potentially offering dealers better integration with OEM marketing funds and sales programs.
Risk of Reduced Independence: The same AutoNation partnership that brings stability also creates a potential conflict of interest. Other dealership groups may be wary of sharing data with a platform that has the nation's largest dealer group as an investor.
Continued Need for Differentiation: TrueCar still faces the same competitive dynamics it did as a public company. The take-private doesn't solve the core challenge of proving that the platform delivers incremental, measurable value that dealers cannot achieve on their own.
The automotive retail industry is in the middle of a fundamental transformation from a dealership-centric, in-person transaction model to an omnichannel model that blends digital and physical experiences. TrueCar was early to this trend — perhaps too early. The company's original premise assumed that consumers wanted to do everything online, when in practice most car buyers still want to visit a dealership for test drives, trade-in appraisals, and final paperwork.
The industry is now converging on a hybrid model: online for research, pricing, and initial steps; in-person for the final transaction. TrueCar's current product suite (especially TrueCar+) is well-positioned for this hybrid world, but the company faces intense competition from dealers' own digital tools, OEM digital retailing platforms (such as Ford's FordDirect or GM's Shop Click Drive), and third-party vendors like CDK, Tekion, and Cox Automotive.
TrueCar's affinity partner network remains one of its most durable competitive advantages. Over 250 organizations offer TrueCar as a member benefit, providing a captive audience of in-market car buyers who arrive with trust already established. As consumer acquisition costs rise across digital channels, the affinity model — where the partner pays for the distribution — becomes increasingly valuable.
TrueCar's 20-year archive of automotive transaction data is a significant competitive asset. The company has accumulated pricing data on tens of millions of transactions, creating a dataset that is difficult for newcomers to replicate. This data fuels both the consumer pricing tools and the ALG residual value business. As artificial intelligence and predictive analytics become more important in automotive retail, this data moat could become even more valuable.
TrueCar is a lead source, not a strategy. The platform can be an effective component of a dealer's marketing mix, but it should not be the centerpiece. Dealers who treat TrueCar as one channel among many — alongside their own website, OEM programs, and traditional advertising — are better positioned regardless of TrueCar's corporate trajectory.
The take-private is a net positive for platform stability. The auto dealers who have the most to lose from TrueCar's struggles are those who have made it their primary customer acquisition channel. The take-private removes the distraction of public market volatility and gives management room to focus on product quality.
Watch the AutoNation dynamic. If you are a dealer group competing with AutoNation, consider whether sharing transaction data through TrueCar creates a competitive disadvantage. If you are not competing with AutoNation, the partnership may improve TrueCar's product quality without directly benefiting your competitors.
ALG data matters. The ALG residual value business is a genuine competitive asset that gives TrueCar a product differentiator even when the consumer marketplace is under pressure. Dealers using ALG data for lease structuring and inventory planning should continue to do so regardless of corporate changes.
The affinity channel remains strong. TrueCar's distribution through credit unions, membership organizations, and employer programs provides a steady flow of high-intent buyers. This channel is less sensitive to the competitive dynamics of the open web and represents a genuine value proposition for dealers.
TrueCar's journey from disruptive startup to public company to founder-led private company is a case study in the complexities of the automotive retail ecosystem. The company's core insight — that consumers deserve to know what others paid before they negotiate — was genuinely valuable. But the business of monetizing that insight proved far harder than anyone anticipated.
The 2026 take-private by Fair Holdings gives TrueCar a second chance. With founder Scott Painter back at the helm, the financial backing of AutoNation and Zurich North America, and the freedom to operate without quarterly earnings constraints, the company has an opportunity to reinvent itself for the next era of automotive retail.
For dealers, the question is not whether to work with TrueCar — it's how to integrate it into a broader digital strategy that doesn't depend on any single platform. The dealers who thrive in the coming decade will be those who master the art of using multiple channels — TrueCar, CarGurus, their own websites, OEM programs, and traditional marketing — as components of an integrated retail strategy. TrueCar can be a valuable part of that mix, but it has never been, and will never be, a complete solution.
The story of TrueCar is ultimately a story about the limits of disruption in a relationship-driven industry. Automotive retail runs on trust between dealers, manufacturers, and consumers. TrueCar showed the industry that transparency was possible. The next chapter — under Painter's return and Fair Holdings' ownership — will show whether the company can build a sustainable business around it.
This article is part of the State of Automotive directory, a data-backed resource for dealership decision-makers. Facts and figures reflect the best available information as of May 2026. Financial metrics for the period after the take-private (post-January 2026) are no longer publicly reported.